2024-VIL-555-ALH

SGST High Court Cases

GST - Interpretation of Section 75(4) of the CGST Act, 2017 – Principle of casus omissus – Denial of opportunity of hearing in proceedings initiated under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act, 2017 - violation of principles of natural justice – Revenue case that proceedings under Section 74(9) of the Act does not provide for personal hearing to be given to the concerned person chargeable with tax or penalty – Petitioner’s contention that Section 75 of the Act will apply actions proposed under Sections 73 and 74 of the Act and the procedure prescribed under Section 75 of the Act will have to be followed by the tax authorities even for determination of tax under Section 74 of the Act - in addition to being given an opportunity for submitting representation, whether the petitioner is also entitled to personal hearing – HELD - Sub-Section (4) of Section 75 provides that an opportunity of hearing shall be granted where a request is received in writing from the person chargeable with tax or penalty, or where any adverse decision is contemplated against such person – ‘Sub-heading’ being an internal aid, can be validly referred to while determining the true purport of the words ‘opportunity of hearing’. Sub-heading of Section 75 clearly states that it describes the ‘General Provisions relating to Determining of Tax’; then most certainly Section 75 deals with all kinds of hearings for determining tax, both at the first instance and also on remand. Also sub-Section (4) is followed by sub-Section (5), which requires an officer to adjourn a hearing on the request of the person chargeable to Tax, in case sufficient cause is shown by such person after recording reasons for such adjournment in writing. Such words as are used for granting more time to the assessee and adjourning the hearing can only be interpreted to mean giving “personal” hearing. Adjournment is granted in cases where hearing is continuing. It cannot be said to relate to giving time extensions for giving written reply to the show cause notice - Taking into account the settled principles of interpretation of Statutes, word “personal” can easily be construed to have been intended to be added but has been left out erroneously - the impugned orders are set aside - The matter is remitted back to the proper officer to provide opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner and then to pass a fresh order in accordance with statutory provisions – the writ petition is allowed - Principles of casus omissus - Two principles of construction, one relating to casus omissus, and the other in regard to reading the Statute as a whole, appear to be well settled. Under the first principle, the casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court, except in the case of clear necessity, and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the Statute itself, but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred, and for that purpose, all parts of the Statute or the section must be construed together, and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof, so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes it consistent of the whole Statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results, which could not have been intended by the legislature. An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a Statute, if there is some other construction available. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result” we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction, as per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC, where it has been observed “this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that itrarely emerges” - Interpretation of Statute - The purpose of interpretation is essentially to know the intention of the legislature. Whether the legislature intended to apply the law in a given case; whether the legislature intended to give discretion to enforcing authority or to adjudicating agency to apply the law, are essentially questions to which answers can be given only by knowing the intention of Legislation. Apart from the general principles of interpretation of statutes, there are certain internal aids and external aids, which are tools for interpreting the Statutes. The long title, the preamble, the heading, the marginal note, punctuation, illustrations, definitions, or exclusionary clause, proviso to a section, explanation, examples, a Schedule to the Act, et cetera are internal aids to construction. The external aids to construction are Parliamentary debates, history leading to the legislation, other statutes which have a bearing, dictionaries, thesaurus etc. It is well accepted that a Statute must be construed according to the intention of the legislature and the Courts should act upon the true intention of the legislation while applying the law and while interpreting the law. If a statutory provision is open to more than one meaning, the Court has to choose the interpretation which represents the intention of the legislature. In other words, legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object, which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. The well settled principle is that when the words in a Statute are clear, plain and unambiguous and only one meaning can be inferred, the courts are bound to give effect to the said meaning irrespective of consequences - In applying the rule of plain meaning, any hardship and inconvenience cannot be the basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislation. This is especially so in fiscal statutes and penal statutes. Nevertheless, if the plain language results in absurdity, the Court is entitled to determine the meaning of the word in the context in which it is used, keeping in view the legislative purpose. Not only that, if the plain construction leads to an anomaly or absurdity, the Court having regard to the hardship and consequences that flow from such a provision can even explain the true intention of the legislation.

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