2026-VIL-167-GSTAT-DEL-NAPA

SGST Tribunal

GST - Anti-profiteering - Validity of re-investigation by the DGAP pursuant to remand by the Competition Commission of India after the Delhi High Court held the methodology in real estate cases to be flawed - Application alleged that the Respondent, a real estate developer, had not passed on the benefit of additional input tax credit to a homebuyer. The DGAP submitted an investigation report. The Competition Commission of India remanded the matter under Rule 133(4) as the methodology was held to be flawed by the Delhi High Court. The Respondent contended that the observation in the High Court judgment was not a direction for universal re-investigation, that it was not a party to those proceedings, and that the Commission had no power to reopen a concluded investigation - Whether the re-investigation is void ab initio for want of jurisdiction - HELD - The infirmity identified by the High Court related to the methodology for computing profiteering and was not peculiar to the parties before it. The relief granted in that case was confined to the parties. The legal principle laid down on methodology is the ratio decidendi and is binding on the Tribunal - The CCI decision to remit pending real estate matters for reinvestigation must therefore be viewed as an attempt to secure uniformity, consistency and conformity with the binding judicial precedent, rather than as an impermissible exercise of suo motu review. The object of the remand was to cure the legal infirmity in the investigative methodology - The Respondent not being a party to the High Court proceedings does not confer a right to have the matter determined on a methodology judicially found to be unsustainable - The Respondent did not demonstrate any specific statutory prohibition or jurisdictional limitation violated - The re-investigation is not without jurisdiction and is not void ab initio - Whether the DGAP became functus officio after submitting the original report and whether a fresh reference under Rule 128 was necessary - The DGAP submitted its original report. The proceedings before the erstwhile Authority had not culminated in a final order when its tenure ended. The Respondent contended that the DGAP could not conduct a second investigation without a fresh reference from the Standing Committee under Rule 128 - Whether the DGAP became functus officio and whether a fresh reference was mandatory before re-investigation - HELD - The doctrine of functus officio applies to a quasi-judicial authority that has finally discharged its function. The original report was rendered infirm by the subsequent judicial pronouncement as it was based on a flawed methodology. The proceedings had not culminated in a final order. Rule 133(4) empowers the Authority to remit the matter to the DGAP for re-investigation. The DGAP acted pursuant to a lawful remand order and not suo motu. The original reference under Rule 128 remained alive. The remand did not necessitate a fresh reference. The DGAP was merely directed to correct the methodology and submit a fresh report in the same proceedings - The DGAP did not become functus officio. A fresh reference under Rule 128 was not required - Limitation for submission of the DGAP report under Rule 129(6) in re-investigation proceedings - The re-investigation was initiated after the remand. The report was submitted well beyond the six months provided under Rule 129(6) and the maximum extended period. The Respondent contended that the proceedings were barred by limitation and that the extension granted by the Tribunal was ultra vires - Whether the re-initiated proceedings are barred by limitation under Rule 129(6) and whether the extension is ultra vires - HELD - Rule 129(6) requires the DGAP to submit its report within six months or within such extended period as may be granted by the Authority - The Delhi High Court has held that the Rules do not provide any consequence on lapse of the time limits. The anti-profiteering provisions are beneficial legislation which must receive liberal construction in favour of the consumer. The time limit for furnishing the report is directory and not mandatory. The proceedings do not abate on lapse of the time limit. The Tribunal had earlier affirmed this position. Though the delay was substantial, it occurred due to the need to obtain complete documents from the Respondent. The Respondent cannot take advantage of its own delay in producing documents. The extension granted by the Tribunal was within the spirit of Rule 129(6) - The proceedings are not barred by limitation - Alleged violation of natural justice due to change in methodology during anti-profiteering proceedings - The Respondent contended that the methodology was changed mid-proceeding without hearing, defeating its legitimate expectation - Whether the Respondent was denied natural justice due to the alleged change in methodology - HELD - The change in methodology was not arbitrary. It was mandated by the judgment of the Delhi High Court. The Respondent was given notice of the re-investigation and an opportunity to submit documents - The fresh report was served on the Respondent and the Tribunal issued notice calling for objections. The Respondent filed written submissions and was heard extensively on its jurisdictional and legal objections. The Respondent chose not to address the merits of the profiteering computation and confined itself to preliminary objections. A party that deliberately elected not to contest the merits cannot allege a violation of natural justice - There was no violation of natural justice - Contravention of Section 171(1) by non-passing of benefit of additional input tax credit to homebuyers - The DGAP found that the input tax credit available to the Respondent as a percentage of purchase value was higher in the post-GST period than in the pre-GST period. The benefit per square foot was computed on the basis of the total savings for the project divided by the total saleable area - Whether the Respondent contravened Section 171 by failing to pass on the benefit of additional input tax credit to eligible homebuyers - HELD - Section 171(1) mandates that any benefit of input tax credit shall be passed on to the recipient by way of commensurate reduction in prices. It is beneficial legislation designed to prevent unjust enrichment and must receive a purposive construction. The obligation is discharged only by actual transmission of the benefit. Once the DGAP determines on the basis of the Respondent's own records that a benefit has accrued and has not been passed on, the evidential burden shifts to the Respondent - The Respondent produced no revised price list, credit note, refund voucher, adjusted invoice or correspondence with any homebuyer. The findings of the DGAP remain unchallenged and uncontroverted. The Respondent cannot approbate and reprobate by refusing to engage with the merits and then asserting that the findings are unsupported - The entire period of contravention was completed before Section 171(3A) came into force, so no penalty is leviable under that provision - The Respondent has contravened Section 171(1). The DGAP report is accepted. The benefit shall be passed on to the eligible homebuyers in proportion to their sold areas within three months along with interest at 18 per cent per annum in terms of Rule 133(3)(b). No penalty is imposed.

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